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CIVIL PROCEDURE

Should FederalCourts Give GreaterEffect to StateJudgments
than Would the Courts that Rendered Them?
by (;ene R. Shreve

Marrese
V.

American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons
(Docket No. 83-1452)
Argued December 4, 1984
American courts have traditionally fashioned and
administered rules which help put an end to the filing of
claims in civil litigation. These rules are embodied in
claim preclusion or, to use the older term, res judicata
doctrines. Under these doctrines, a final judgment precludes the same parties from relitigating the same claim
and may also preclude them from litigating some claims
not previously raised. Disappointed parties clearly need
to be stopped from relitigating the same claims, but it is
a more difficult matter to decide when claims not actually raised in the proceeding should also be precluded.
This is the problem posed in Alarrese v. American Acadeinm
of Orthopaedic Surgeons.
ISSUES
In Marrese, the Supreme Court will consider whether
a federal statute (28 U.S.C. 1738) prevents federal
courts fron going farther than Illinois courts would go
in giving preclusive effect to an Illinois state judgment.
Should the Supreme Court conclude that section 1738
leaves federal courts free to augment the preclusive
effects of state judgments, it must further consider
whether, as a matter of federal law and policy, the facts
of Marrese present an appropriate occasion For precluding claims. The broader policy questions include:
Should federal courts ever give preclusive effect to a
judgment when tile court which rendered it would not
have been competent to adjudicate the precluded claim?
Would using a state courtjudgment to preclude a subsequent claim brought within the federal court's exclusive
jurisdiction frustrate the very purpose of exclusive jurisdiction?
FACTS
Dr. Marrese and a co-petitioner were denied menbership in the American Academy of Orthopaedic SurGene R. Shreve is a Professor of Law at New York Law School,
57 Worth Street, New York, NY 10013; telephone (212)
431-2100.
Issue No. 8

geons (Acaderny)-a professional organization. They
sued in Illinois state court, alleging that the Academy
had breached a duty which arises under the Illinois
Constitution and common law-the duty to fairly consider their applications. The Illinois proceedings were
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Marrese then
brought tile present suit in federal district court in Illinois under the Sherman Act, invoking tile federal
court's exclusive jurisdiction over the antitrust claims.
Tile Academy moved to dismiss these claims on the
ground that they were precluded by the final judgments
in the prior Illinois state proceeding. After several decisions at the district and circuit levels, the Seventh Circuit
decided, en banc, that the claims were precluded (726
F.2cl 1150 (1984)).
Writing for a plurality of' the court, judge Posner
stated that the purpose of' the federal claim preclusion
doctrine was to avoid claim-splitting. Judge Posner acknowledged that the federal antitrust claims in this case
could not have been joined with claims filed in tile state
proceeding because of tile federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust issues. He noted, however, that
petitioners could have presented an antitrust claim
under Illinois state law in the state proceeding. Julge
Posner suggested that if the state antitrust claim had
initially been joined with the claims actually raised in the
state case and if*the state antitrust claim had been finally
adjudicated there, that would have pirecltlecl subsequent federal adjudication of' the federal antitrust
claims. He reasoned that the result should not be different because the state antitrust claim was not actually
raised in the Illinois proceeding.
The court's decision commanded only a bare najority. The dissenters noted that the Illinois claim preclusion doctrine followed the general principle that courts,
by theirjudgments, are unable to preclude claims which
they were not competent to adjudicate. They argued
that, because the authority of thejudgment was limited
under Illinois law and because 28 U.S.C. 1738 bound
federal judges to respect state law limitations, the federal antitrust claims raised here were not precluled.
The dissenters further argued that, even if' federal
courts were free to entertain the possibility of' giving
greater force to a state judgment, Marrese presentedi an
inappropriate occasion for doing so for several reasons.
The dissent noted material differences between the state
and federal antitrust causes of' action. As it more basic
matter, the dissenters questioned the propriety of' the
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plurality's comparison of the Illinois and federal antitrust actions wuen the state antitrust claim had not been
presented in the Illinois proceeding. They also questioned the wisdom of regarding the court which originally heard the case to have more power to preclude
than to adjudicate. The dissenters were especially concerned that the approach of the plurality in Marrese
could lead to trial in absentia of federal antitrust claims in
state proceedings. This, they felt, would undermine the
goal of uniform interpretation and application ofr federal antitrust law intended by exclusive federal jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Preclusion doctrines have been expanded in recent
years, and the Supreme Court has placed federal courts
in the forefront of this movement. Maximum use of
preclusion doctrines makes particular sense in the federal court system for two reasons. First, preclusion doctrines promote conservation of severely taxed federal
judicial resources. Second, liberal pleading and liberal
claim and party joinder requirements in federal court
should help dispose of as many controversies as possible
in the first instance. Preclusion doctrines advance this
objective by penalizing piecemeal litigation and delay.
The Supreme Court's tendency to be sympathetic to
preclusion arguments in the past cannot be ignored. At
the same time, Marrese raises new and perplexing issues.
In two recent opinions, the Supreme Cot t held that
28 U.S.C. 1738 required federal courts to give state
judgments as much claim-preclusive effect as would the
courts which rendered them (Migra v. Warren City School
DistrictBoard of Education, 104 S. Ct. 892, 896 (1984) and
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883,
1897-1899 (1982)). In neither of the cases, however, was
the Court required to consider whether federal courts
were free to give greater preclusive effect to state judgments. Depending on how it reads Illinois state claim
preclusion law, the Supreme Court may find it necessary
to resolve this issue in Marrese.
Should the Supreme Court conclude that section
1738 leaves the federal court free to arrive at its own
answer concerning further possibilities of claim preclusion, it may pass on several additional matters. First, the
Court may have to resolve the Seventh Circuit's disagreement with the American Law Institute's Restatement
of.Judgments, Second section 26(c) (1982), which states
that courts without the power to hear claims should not
be able to render judgments which extinguish them.
The comment following section 26 notes where the principle has been aPplied to cases subsequently brought
within the exclusive jurisdiction of' the federal court and
offers a hypothetical case and decision which directly
contradicts the Seventh Circuit's decision in Marrese.
Second, the Supreme Court may have to decide whether
contravailing federal policies require it to sacrifice tile
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efliciencies of claim preclusion. In another context, the
Supreme Court recently found it necessary for preclusion to yield to strong federal policy (United States v.
Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984)). In Marrese, the Court
may have to gauge the effect of its decision on policies
underlying exclusive federal jurisdiction. Finally, the
Supreme Court may see in Marrese a f'urther outlet for
its concern that federal judges display deference toward
their state counterparts. However, preclusion issues do
not yield to federalism analysis as easily as Eleventh
Amendment or abstention issues did in previous Court
decisions. It is not obvious in Marrese which result best
assures the integrity of the Illinois state judicial process.
.judge Posner maintained in his opinion that preclusion
would. The Attorney General ol Illinois as ainicus in the
case disagrees.
ARGUMENTS
For Marrese (Counsel of Record, John J.Casey, r.., 111 II'.
Washington Street, Chicago, IL 60602; telephone (312) 3466650)
1. Illinois' claim preclusion law, applicable by mandate
of the full faith and credit statute (28 U.S.C. 1738),
prohibits precluding this exclusively federal claim.
2. Exclusively federal claims are an implied exception to
the full faith and credit statute and may never be
precluded by a prior state courtjudgment.
3. The Seventh Circuit's decision must be reversed because of the plurality's erroneous approach to determining the "material identity" of the hypothetical
corresponding state and federal claims.
For American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (Counsel
of Record, D. Kendall Griffith, 69 IV. Washington Street,
Chicago, IL 60602; telephone (312) 630-4400)
1. This action is barred by the full faith and credit
statute (28 U.S.C. 1738) because the prior Illinois
courtjudgments preclude a subsequent suit in Illinois
based on the same cause of action.
2. There is no exception to the full faith and credit
statute for a party who voluntarily chooses to litigate
its cause of action in a state forum, loses, and then
attempts to relitigate the matter under a federal antitrust theory.
3. This action is barred under federal claim preclusion
law.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Support of Marrese
The States of the Seventh Circuit: Illinois, Indiana and
Wisconsin
1.The plurality opinion places unwarranted obstln ttions in the path of state law enforcement. State
courts will be unable to gauge the effects of* their own
judgments and the policies of state law enforcenent
agencies will be disrupted.
i'REVI EW

